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The Capacity of Private Information Retrieval
Hua Sun and Syed A. Jafar
Abstract
In the private information retrieval (PIR) problem a user wishes to retrieve, as efficiently as
possible, one out of K messages from N non-communicating databases (each holds all K mes-
sages) while revealing nothing about the identity of the desired message index to any individual
database. The information theoretic capacity of PIR is the maximum number of bits of desired
information that can be privately retrieved per bit of downloaded information. For K messages
and N databases, we show that the PIR capacity is
(
1 + 1/N + 1/N2 + · · ·+ 1/NK−1
)
−1
. A re-
markable feature of the capacity achieving scheme is that if we eliminate any subset of messages
(by setting the message symbols to zero), the resulting scheme also achieves the PIR capacity
for the remaining subset of messages.
1 Introduction
Marked by paradigm-shifting developments such as big data, cloud computing, and internet of
things, the modern information age presents researchers with an unconventional set of challenges.
The rapidly evolving research landscape continues to blur traditional boundaries between computer
science, communication and information theory, coding and signal processing. For example, the
index coding problem which was introduced by computer scientists in 1998 [1, 2], is now a very
active research topic in information theory because of its fundamental connections to a broad range
of questions that includes topological interference management [3], network coding [4], distributed
storage capacity [5], hat guessing [6], and non-Shannon information inequalities [7]. Evidently, the
crossover of problems across fields creates exciting opportunities for fundamental progress through
a consolidation of complementary perspectives. The pursuit of such crossovers brings us to the
private information retrieval (PIR) problem [8, 9, 10].
Introduced in 1995 by Chor, Kushilevitz, Goldreich and Sudan [11, 12], the private information
retrieval (PIR) problem seeks the most efficient way for a user to retrieve a desired message from a
set of distributed databases, each of which stores all the messages, without revealing any information
about which message is being retrieved to any individual database. The user can hide his interests
trivially by requesting all the information, but that could be very inefficient (expensive). The goal
of the PIR problem is to find the most efficient solution.
Besides its direct applications, PIR is of broad interest because it shares intimate connections
to many other prominent problems. PIR attracted our attention initially in [10] because of its
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curious similarities to Blind Interference Alignment [13]. PIR protocols are the essential ingredients
of oblivious transfer [14], instance hiding [15, 16, 17], multiparty computation [18], secret sharing
schemes [19, 20] and locally decodable codes [21]. Through the connection between locally decodable
and locally recoverable codes [22], PIR also connects to distributed data storage repair [23], index
coding [2] and the entire umbrella of network coding [24] in general. As such PIR holds tremendous
promise as a point of convergence of complementary perspectives. The characterization of the
information theoretic capacity of PIR that we undertake in this work, is a step in this direction.
The PIR problem is described as follows. We have N non-communicating databases, each
stores the full set of K independent messages W1, · · · ,WK . A user wants one of the messages, say
Wθ, θ ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}, but requires each database to learn absolutely nothing (in the information
theoretic sense)1 about the retrieved message index, θ. To do so, the user generates N queries
Q1, · · · , QN and sends Qn, n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} to the n-th database. After receiving query Qn, the
n-th database returns an answering string An to the user. The user must be able to obtain the
desired message Wθ from all the answers A1, · · · , AN . To be private, each query Qn and each
answer An must be independent of the desired message index, θ.
For example, suppose we have N = 2 databases and K messages. To retrieve Wθ privately,
the user first generates a random length-K vector [h1, h2, · · · , hK ], where each element is inde-
pendent and identically distributed uniformly over F2, i.e., equally likely to be 0 or 1. Then the
user sends Q1 = [h1, h2, · · · , hθ, · · · , hK ] to the first database and Q2 = [h1, h2, · · · , hθ−1, (hθ +
1), hθ+1, · · · , hK ] to the second database. Each database uses the query vector as the combining
coefficients and produces the corresponding linear combination of message bits as the answer to
the query.
A1 =
K∑
k=1
hkWk (1)
A2 =
K∑
k=1
hkWk +Wθ (2)
The user obtains Wθ by subtracting A1 from A2. Privacy is guaranteed because each query is
independent of the desired message index θ. This is because regardless of the desired message
index θ, each of the query vectors Q1, Q2 is individually comprised of elements that are i.i.d.
uniform over F2. Thus, each database learns nothing about which message is requested.
The PIR problem was initially studied in the setting where each message is one bit long [11, 12,
26, 27, 28, 21, 29], where the cost of a PIR scheme is measured by the total amount of communication
between the user and the databases, i.e., the sum of lengths of each query string (upload) and
each answering string (download). However, for the traditional Shannon theoretic formulation,
where message size is allowed to be arbitrarily large, the upload cost is negligible compared to
the download cost [30]2. In this work we adopt the Shannon theoretic formulation, so that we
focus on the download cost, measured relative to the message size. For the example presented
above, each message is 1 bit and we download a total of 2 bits (one from each database), so that
the download cost is 2 bits per message bit. The reciprocal of download cost is the rate, i.e., the
number of bits of desired information that is privately retrieved per downloaded information bit.
1There is another line of research, where privacy needs to be satisfied only for computationally bounded databases
[9, 8, 25].
2The justification argument (traces back to Proposition 4.1.1 of [12]) is that the upload cost does not scale with
the message size. This is because we can reuse the original query functions for each part of the message.
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The maximum rate possible for the PIR problem is its information theoretic capacity C. For the
example presented earlier, the private information retrieval rate is 12 , meaning that 1 bit of desired
information is retrieved from every 2 downloaded bits. In general, for arbitrary N and K, the best
previously known achievable rate for PIR, reported in [31], is 1 − 1N . Since 1 is a trivial upper
bound on capacity, we know that 1 ≥ C ≥ 1− 1N . The bounds present a reasonable approximation
of capacity for large number of databases. However, in this work, we seek the exact information
theoretic capacity C of the PIR problem, for arbitrary number of messages K and arbitrary number
of databases N .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the problem statement. The exact capacity
of PIR is characterized in Section 3. Section 4 presents a novel PIR scheme, and Section 5 provides
the information theoretic converse (i.e., a tight upper bound) to establish its optimality. Section 6
contains a discussion of the results and we conclude in Section 7.
Notation: For a positive integer Z, we use the notation [Z] = {1, 2, · · · , Z}. The notation X ∼
Y is used to indicate that X and Y are identically distributed. Define the notation An1:n2 , n1, n2 ∈ Z,
as the set {An1 , An1+1, · · · , An2} if n1 ≤ n2, and as the null set otherwise.
2 Problem Statement
Consider K independent messages W1, · · · ,WK of size L bits each.
H(W1, · · · ,WK) = H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK), (3)
H(W1) = · · · = H(WK) = L. (4)
There are N databases and each database stores all the messages W1, · · · ,WK . In PIR a user
privately generates θ ∈ [K] and wishes to retrieve Wθ while keeping θ a secret from each database.
Depending on θ, there are K strategies that the user could employ to privately retrieve his de-
sired message. For example, if θ = k, then in order to retrieve Wk, the user employs N queries
Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q
[k]
N . Since the queries are determined by the user with no knowledge of the realizations
of the messages, the queries must be independent of the messages,
∀k ∈ [K], I(W1, · · · ,WK ;Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q
[k]
N ) = 0. (5)
The user sends query Q
[k]
n to the n-th database. Upon receiving Q
[k]
n , the n-th database generates an
answering string A
[k]
n , which is a function ofQ
[k]
n and the data stored (i.e., all messagesW1, · · · ,WK).
∀k ∈ [K],∀n ∈ [N ], H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n ,W1, · · · ,WK) = 0. (6)
Each database returns to the user its answer A
[k]
n . From all the information that is now available
to the user, he must be able to decode the desired message Wk, with probability of error Pe. The
probability of error must approach zero as the size of each message L approaches infinity3. From
Fano’s inequality, we have
[Correctness]
1
L
H(Wk|A
[k]
1 , · · · , A
[k]
N , Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q
[k]
N ) = o(L) (7)
where o(L) represents any term whose value approaches zero as L approaches infinity.
3If Pe is required to be exactly zero, then the o(L) terms can be replaced with 0.
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To protect the user’s privacy, theK strategies must be indistinguishable (identically distributed)
from the perspective of each database, i.e., the following privacy constraint must be satisfied4
∀n ∈ [N ],∀k ∈ [K]:
[Privacy] (Q[1]n , A
[1]
n ,W1, · · · ,WK) ∼ (Q
[k]
n , A
[k]
n ,W1, · · · ,WK) (8)
The PIR rate characterizes how many bits of desired information are retrieved per downloaded
bit, and is defined as follows.
R ,
L
D
(9)
where D is the expected value (over random queries) of the total number of bits downloaded by the
user from all the databases. Note that because of the privacy constraint (8), the expected number
of downloaded bits for each message must be the same.
A rate R is said to be ǫ-error achievable if there exists a sequence of PIR schemes, each of rate
greater than or equal to R, for which Pe → 0 as L→∞.
5 The supremum of ǫ-error achievable rates
is called the ǫ-error capacity Cǫ. A stronger (more constrained) notion of capacity is the zero-error
capacity Co, which is the supremum of zero-error achievable rates. A rate R is said to be zero-error
achievable if there exists a PIR scheme of rate greater than or equal to R for which Pe = 0. From
the definitions, it is evident that Co ≤ Cǫ. While in noise-less settings, the two are often the same,
in general the inequality can be strict. Our goal is to characterize both the zero-error capacity, Co,
and the ǫ-error capacity, Cǫ, of PIR.
3 Main Result: Capacity of Private Information Retrieval
Theorem 1 states the main result.
Theorem 1 For the private information retrieval problem with K messages and N databases, the
capacity is
Co = Cǫ =
(
1 + 1/N + 1/N2 + · · ·+ 1/NK−1
)−1
. (10)
The following observations are in order.
1. For N > 1 databases, the capacity expression can be equivalently expressed as (1− 1N )/(1−(
1
N
)K
).
2. The capacity is strictly higher than the previously best known achievable rate of 1− 1/N .
3. The capacity is a strictly decreasing function of the number of messages, K, and when the
number of messages approaches infinity, the capacity approaches 1− 1/N .
4. The capacity is strictly increasing in the number of databases, N . As the number of databases
approaches infinity, the capacity approaches 1.
5. Since the download cost is the reciprocal of the rate, Theorem 1 equivalently characterizes
the optimal download cost per message bit as
(
1 + 1/N + 1/N2 + · · ·+ 1/NK−1
)
bits.
4The privacy constraint is equivalently expressed as I(θ;Q
[θ]
n , A
[θ]
n ,W1,W2, · · · ,WK) = 0.
5Equivalently, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a finite Lǫ such that Pe < ǫ for all L > Lǫ.
4
6. The achievability proof for Theorem 1 to be presented in the next section, shows that message
size approaching infinity is not necessary to approach capacity. In fact, it suffices to have
messages of size equal to any positive integer multiple of NK bits (or NK symbols in any
finite field) each to achieve a rate exactly equal to capacity, and with zero-error.
7. The upper bound proof will show that no PIR scheme can achieve a rate higher than capacity
with Pe → 0 as message size L→∞. Unbounded message size is essential to the information
theoretic formulation of capacity. However, from a practical standpoint, it is natural to ask
what this means if the message size is limited. Finding the optimal rate for limited message
size remains an open problem in general. However, we note that regardless of message size, Co
(and therefore also Cǫ) is always an upper bound on zero-error rate. For arbitrary message size
L, a naive extension of our PIR scheme can be obtained as follows. Pad zeros to each message,
rounding up the message size to an integer multiple of NK . Then over each block of NK
symbols per message, directly use the capacity achieving PIR scheme. This achieves the rate
Co
L
NK
/
⌈
L
NK
⌉
, which matches capacity exactly if L is a positive integer multiple of NK , and
otherwise, approaches capacity for large L. It is also clearly sub-optimal in general, especially
for smaller message sizes where much better schemes are already known. Additional discussion
on message size reduction for a capacity achieving PIR scheme is presented in Section 6.
4 Theorem 1: Achievability
We present a zero-error PIR scheme for L = NK bits per message in this section, whose rate
is equal to capacity. Note that a zero-error scheme with finite message length can always be
repeatedly applied to create a sequence of schemes with message-lengths approaching infinity for
which the probability of error approaches (is) zero. Thus, the same scheme will suffice as the proof
of achievability for both zero-error and ǫ-error capacity.
Let us illustrate the intuition behind the achievable scheme with a few simple examples. Then,
based on the examples, we will present an algorithmic description of the achievable scheme for
arbitrary number of messages, K and arbitrary number of databases, N . We will then revisit the
examples in light of the algorithmic formulation. Finally, we will prove that the scheme is both
correct and private, and that its rate is equal to the capacity.
4.1 Two Examples to Illustrate the Key Ideas
The capacity achieving PIR scheme has a myopic or greedy character, in that it starts with a
narrow focus on the retrieval of the desired message bits from the first database, but grows into a
full fledged scheme based on iterative application of three principles:
(1) Enforcing Symmetry Across Databases
(2) Enforcing Message Symmetry within the Query to Each Database
(3) Exploiting Side Information of Undesired Messages to Retrieve New Desired Information
4.1.1 Example 1: N = 2,K = 2
Consider the simplest PIR setting, with N = 2 databases, and K = 2 messages with L = NK = 4
bits per message. Let [a1, a2, a3, a4] represent a random permutation of L = 4 bits from W1.
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Similarly, let [b1, b2, b3, b4] represent an independent random permutation of L = 4 bits from W2.
These permutations are generated privately and uniformly by the user.
Suppose the desired message is W1, i.e., θ = 1. We start with a query that requests the first
bit a1 from the first database (DB1). Applying database symmetry, we simultaneously request a2
from the second database (DB2). Next, we enforce message symmetry, by including queries for
b1 and b2 as the counterparts for a1 and a2. Now we have side information of b2 from DB2 to be
exploited in an additional query to DB1, which requests a new desired information bit a3 mixed
with b2. Finally, applying database symmetry we have the corresponding query a4 + b1 for DB2.
At this point the queries satisfy symmetry across databases, message symmetry within the query
to each database, and all undesired side information is exploited, so the construction is complete.
The process is explained below, where the number above an arrow indicates which of the three
principles highlighted above is used in each step.
DB1 DB2
a1
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1 a2
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1 a2, b2
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1 a2, b2
a3 + b2
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1 a2, b2
a3 + b2 a4 + b1
Similarly, the queries for θ = 2 are constructed as follows.
DB1 DB2
b1
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2
b1 b2
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1 a2, b2
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1 a2, b2
a2 + b3
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1 a2, b2
a2 + b3 a1 + b4
Privacy is ensured by noting that [a1, a2, a3, a4] is a random permutation ofW1 and [b1, b2, b3, b4]
is an independent random permutation of W2. These permutations are only known to the user and
not to the databases. Therefore, regardless of the desired message, each database is asked for one
randomly chosen bit of each message and a sum of a different pair of randomly chosen bits from
each message. Since the permutations are uniform, all possible realizations are equally likely, and
privacy is guaranteed.
To verify correctness, note that every desired bit is either downloaded directly or added with
known side information which can be subtracted to retrieve the desired bit value. Thus, the desired
message bits are successfully recoverable from the downloaded information.
Now, consider the rate of this scheme. The total number of downloaded bits is 6 and the number
of desired bits is 4. Thus, the rate of this scheme is 4/6 = 2/3 which matches the capacity for this
case.
Finally, let us represent the structure of the queries (to any database) in the following matrix.
a
b
a+ b
a (b) represents a place-holder for a distinct element of ai (bj). The key to the structure is that it
is made up of sums (a single variable is also named a (trivial) sum) of message bits, no message
bit appears more than once, and all possible assignments of message bits to these place-holders are
equally likely. The structure matrix will be useful for the algorithmic description later.
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4.1.2 Example 2: N = 3,K = 3
The second example is when N = 3, K = 3. In this case, all messages have L = NK = 27
bits. The construction of the optimal PIR scheme for N = 3,K = 3 is illustrated below,
where [a1, · · · , a27], [b1, · · · , b27], [c1, · · · , c27] are three i.i.d. uniform permutations of bits from
W1,W2,W3, respectively. The construction of the queries from each database when θ = 1 may be
visualized as follows.
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1 a2 a3
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2 a3, b3, c3
· · ·
· · ·
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2 a3, b3, c3
a4 + b2
a5 + c2
a6 + b3
a7 + c3
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2 a3, b3, c3
a4 + b2 a8 + b1 a12 + b1
a5 + c2 a9 + c1 a13 + c1
a6 + b3 a10 + b3 a14 + b2
a7 + c3 a11 + c3 a15 + c2
· · ·
· · ·
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2 a3, b3, c3
a4 + b2 a8 + b1 a12 + b1
a5 + c2 a9 + c1 a13 + c1
a6 + b3 a10 + b3 a14 + b2
a7 + c3 a11 + c3 a15 + c2
b4 + c4 b6 + c6 b8 + c8
b5 + c5 b7 + c7 b9 + c9
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2 a3, b3, c3
a4 + b2 a8 + b1 a12 + b1
a5 + c2 a9 + c1 a13 + c1
a6 + b3 a10 + b3 a14 + b2
a7 + c3 a11 + c3 a15 + c2
b4 + c4 b6 + c6 b8 + c8
b5 + c5 b7 + c7 b9 + c9
a16 + b6 + c6
a17 + b7 + c7
a18 + b8 + c8
a19 + b9 + c9
· · ·
· · ·
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2 a3, b3, c3
a4 + b2 a8 + b1 a12 + b1
a5 + c2 a9 + c1 a13 + c1
a6 + b3 a10 + b3 a14 + b2
a7 + c3 a11 + c3 a15 + c2
b4 + c4 b6 + c6 b8 + c8
b5 + c5 b7 + c7 b9 + c9
a16 + b6 + c6 a20 + b4 + c4 a24 + b4 + c4
a17 + b7 + c7 a21 + b5 + c5 a25 + b5 + c5
a18 + b8 + c8 a22 + b8 + c8 a26 + b6 + c6
a19 + b9 + c9 a23 + b9 + c9 a27 + b7 + c7
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Similarly, the queries when θ = 2, 3 are as follows.
θ = 2 θ = 3
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2 a3, b3, c3
a2 + b4 a1 + b8 a1 + b12
b5 + c2 b9 + c1 b13 + c1
a3 + b6 a3 + b10 a2 + b14
b7 + c3 c3 + b11 b15 + c2
a4 + c4 a6 + c6 a8 + c8
a5 + c5 a7 + c7 a9 + c9
a6 + b16 + c6 a4 + b20 + c4 a4 + b24 + c4
a7 + b17 + c7 a5 + b21 + c5 a5 + b25 + c5
a8 + b18 + c8 a8 + b22 + c8 a6 + b26 + c6
a9 + b19 + c9 a9 + b23 + c9 a7 + b27 + c7
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2, b2, c2 a3, b3, c3
a2 + c4 a1 + c8 a1 + c12
b2 + c5 b1 + c9 b1 + c13
a3 + c6 a3 + c10 a2 + c14
b3 + c7 b3 + c11 b2 + c15
a4 + b4 a6 + b6 a8 + b8
a5 + b5 a7 + b7 a9 + b9
a6 + b6 + c16 a4 + b4 + c20 a4 + b4 + c24
a7 + b7 + c17 a5 + b5 + c21 a5 + b5 + c25
a8 + b8 + c18 a8 + b8 + c22 a6 + b6 + c26
a9 + b9 + c19 a9 + b9 + c23 a7 + b7 + c27
The structure of the queries is summarized in the following structure matrix. Note again that
the structure matrix is made up of sums of place-holders of message bits, no message bit appears
more than once, and the assignment of all messages bits to these place-holders is equally likely.
a
b
c
a+ b
a+ b
a+ c
a+ c
b+ c
b+ c
a+ b+ c
a+ b+ c
a+ b+ c
a+ b+ c
The examples illustrated above generalize naturally to arbitrary N and K. As we proceed to
proofs of privacy and correctness and to calculate the rate for arbitrary parameters, a more formal
algorithmic description will be useful.
4.2 Formal Description of Achievable Scheme
For all k ∈ [K], define6 vectors Uk = [uk(1), uk(2), · · · , uk(N
K)]. We will use the terminology
k-sum to denote an expression representing the sum of k distinct variables, each drawn from a
different Uj vector, i.e., uj1(i1) + uj2(i2) + · · · + ujk(ik), where j1, j2, · · · , jk ∈ [K] are all distinct
indices. Furthermore, we will define such a k-sum to be of type {j1, j2, · · · , jk}.
The achievable scheme is comprised of the following elements: 1) a fixed query set structure, 2)
an algorithm to generate the query set as a deterministic function of θ, and 3) a random mapping
6Since the number of messages, K, can be arbitrary, and we have only 26 letters in the English alphabet, instead of
ai, bj , ck, etc., we now use u1(i), u2(j), u3(k), etc., to represent random permutations of bits from different messages.
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from Uk variables to message bits, which will produce the actual queries to be sent to the databases.
The random mapping will be privately generated by the user, unknown to the databases. These
elements are described next.
4.2.1 A Fixed Query Set Structure
For all DB ∈ [N ], θ ∈ [K], let us define ‘query sets’: Q(DB, θ), which must satisfy the following
structural properties. Each Q(DB, θ) must be the union of K disjoint subsets called “blocks”,
that are indexed by k ∈ [K]. Block k must contain only k-sums. Note that there are only
(
K
k
)
possible “types” of k-sums. Block k must contain all of them. We require that block k contains
exactly (N − 1)k−1 distinct instances of each type of k-sum. This requirement is chosen following
the intuition from the three principles, and as we will prove shortly, it ensures that the resulting
scheme is capacity achieving. Thus, the total number of elements contained in block k must
be
(K
k
)
(N − 1)k−1, and the total number of elements in each query set must be |Q(DB, θ)| =∑K
k=1
(
K
k
)
(N − 1)k−1. For example, for N = 3,K = 3, as illustrated previously, there are
(
3
1
)
= 3
types of 1-sums (a, b, c) and we have (3 − 1)1−1 = 1 instances of each; there are
(3
2
)
= 3 types of
2-sums (a+ b, b+ c, c+ a) and we have (3− 1)2−1 = 2 instances of each; and there is
(3
3
)
= 1 type
of 3-sum (a + b + c) and we have (3 − 1)3−1 = 4 instances of it. The query to each database has
this structure. Furthermore, no message symbol can appear more than once in a query set for any
given database.
The structure of Block k of the query Q(DB, θ), enforced by the constraints described above, is
illustrated in Figure 1 through an enumeration of all its elements. In the figure, each Uj represents
a place-holder for a distinct element of Uj . Note that the structure as represented in Figure 1 is
fixed regardless of θ and DB. All query sets must have the same fixed structure.
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Type No. Type of k-sum Instance No. Enumerated elements of Block k
1. {1, 2, · · · , k − 2, k − 1, k} 1. U1 + U2 + · · ·+ Uk−2 + Uk−1 + Uk
2. U1 + U2 + · · ·+ Uk−2 + Uk−1 + Uk
...
...
(N − 1)k−1. U1 + U2 + · · ·+ Uk−2 + Uk−1 + Uk
2. {1, 2, · · · , k − 2, k − 1, k + 1} 1. U1 + U2 + · · ·+ Uk−2 + Uk−1 + Uk+1
2. U1 + U2 + · · ·+ Uk−2 + Uk−1 + Uk+1
...
...
(N − 1)k−1. U1 + U2 + · · ·+ Uk−2 + Uk−1 + Uk+1
...
...
...
i. {i1, i2, · · · , ik} 1. Ui1 + Ui2 + · · · + Uik
2. Ui1 + Ui2 + · · · + Uik
...
...
(N − 1)k−1. Ui1 + Ui2 + · · · + Uik
...
...
...(
K
k
)
. {K − k + 1,K − k + 2, · · · ,K} 1. UK−k+1 + UK−k+2 + · · ·+ UK
2. UK−k+1 + UK−k+2 + · · ·+ UK
...
...
(N − 1)k−1. UK−k+1 + UK−k+2 + · · ·+ UK
Figure 1: Structure of Block k of Q(DB, θ). The structure does not depend on θ or DB. Each U j
is a place-holder for a distinct variable from Uj .
4.2.2 A Deterministic Algorithm
Next we present the algorithm which will produce Q(DB, θ) for all DB ∈ [N ] as function of θ alone.
In particular, this algorithm will determine which Uj variable is assigned to each place-holder value
in the query structure described earlier. To present the algorithm we need these definitions.
For each k ∈ [K], let new(Uk) be a function that, starting with uk(1), returns the “next”
variable in Uk each time it is called with Uk as its argument. So, for example, the follow-
ing sequence of calls to this function: new(U2), new(U1), new(U1), new(U1) + new(U2) will produce
u2(1), u1(1), u1(2), u1(3) + u2(2) as the output.
Let us partition each block k into two subsets — a subset M that contains the k-sums which
include a variable from Uθ, and a subset I which contains all the remaining k-sums which contain
no symbols from Uθ.
7
Using these definitions the algorithm is presented next.
7The nomenclature M and I corresponds to ‘message’ and ‘interference’, respectively.
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Algorithm 1 Input: θ. Output: Query sets Q(DB, θ), ∀DB ∈ [N ]
1: Initialize: All query sets are initialized as null sets. Also initialize Block← 1;
2: for DB = 1 : N do
Q(DB, θ,Block,M) ← {new(Uθ)} (11)
Q(DB, θ,Block,I) ←
⋃
k∈[K],k 6=θ
{new(Uk)} (12)
3: end for
4: for Block = 2 : K do {Generate each block...}
5: for DB = 1 : N do {for each database...}
6: for each DB′ = 1 : N and DB′ 6= DB do {by looking at all ‘other’ databases, and...}
7: for each8 q ∈ Q(DB′, θ,Block− 1,I) do {use the ‘I’ terms from their previous block...}
Q(DB, θ,Block,M)← Q(DB, θ,Block,M) ∪ {new(Uθ) + q} (13)
{...to create new M terms for this block by adding a new Uθ variable to each term.}
8: end for (q)
9: end for (DB′)
10: for all distinct {i1, i2, · · · , iBlock} ⊂ [K]/{θ} do {For all “types” that do not include θ...}
11: for i = 1 : (N − 1)Block−1 do {generate exactly (N − 1)Block−1 new instances of each.}
Q(DB, θ,Block,I)← Q(DB, θ,Block,I) ∪ {new(Ui1) + new(Ui2) + · · · + new(UiBlock)}
12: end for (i)
13: end for ({i1, i2, · · · , iBlock})
14: end for (DB)
15: end for (Block)
16: for DB = 1 : N do
17: Q(DB, θ)←
⋃
Block∈[K]
(
Q(DB, θ,Block,I) ∪Q(DB, θ,Block,M)
)
18: end for
Algorithm 1 realizes the 3 principles as follows. The for-loop in steps 5 to 14 ensures database
symmetry (principle (1)). The for-loop in steps 10 to 13 ensures message symmetry within one
database (principle (2)). Steps 7 to 8 retrieve new desired information using existing side informa-
tion (principle (3)).
The proof that the Q(DB, θ) produced by this algorithm indeed satisfy the query structure
described before, is presented in Lemma 1.
8For any set Q, when accessing its elements in an algorithm (e.g., for all q ∈ Q, do . . .), the output of the algorithm
will in general depend on the order in which the elements are accessed. However, for our algorithmic descriptions
the order is not important, i.e., any form of ordered access produces an optimal PIR scheme. By default, a natural
lexicographic ordering may be assumed.
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4.2.3 Ordered Representation and Mapping to Message Bits to Produce Q
[θ]
DB
It is useful at this point to have an ordered vector representation of the query structure, as well
as the query set Q(DB, θ). For the query structure, let us first order the blocks in increasing
order of block index. Then within the k-th block, k ∈ [K], arrange the “types” of k-sums by first
sorting the indices into (i1, i2, · · · , ik) such that i1 < i2 < · · · < ik, and then arranging the k-tuples
(i1, i2, · · · , ik) in increasing lexicographic order. For the query set, we have the same arrangement
for blocks and types, but then for each given type, we further sort the multiple instances of that
type by the i index of the uk(i) term with the smallest k value in that type. Let ~Q(DB, θ) denote
the ordered representation of Q(DB, θ). Next we will map the uk(i) variables to message bits to
produce a query vector.
Suppose each messageWk, k ∈ [K], is represented by the vectorWk = [wk(1), wk(2), · · · , wk(N
K)],
where wk(i) is the binary random variable representing the i-th bit ofWk. The user privately chooses
permutations γ1, γ2, · · · , γK , uniformly randomly from all possible (N
K)! permutations over the in-
dex set [NK ], so that the permutations are independent of each other and of θ. The Uk variables
are mapped to the messages Wk through the random permutation γk, ∀k ∈ [K]. Let Γ denote an
operator that replaces every instance of uk(i) with wk(γk(i)), ∀k ∈ [K], i ∈ [N
K ]. For example,
Γ({u1(2), u3(4) + u5(6)}) = {w1(γ1(2)), w3(γ3(4)) + w5(γ5(6))}. This random mapping, applied to
~Q(DB, θ) produces the actual query vector Q
[θ]
DB that is sent to database DB as
Q
[θ]
DB = “Γ
(
~Q(DB, θ)
)
” (14)
We use the double-quotes notation around a random variable to represent the query about its
realization. For example, while w1(1) is a random variable, which may take the value 0 or 1, in
our notation “w1(1)” is not random, because it only represents the question: “what is the value
of w1(1)?” This is an important distinction, in light of constraints such as (5) which require that
queries must be independent of messages, i.e., message realizations. Note that our queries are
indeed independent of message realizations because the queries are generated by the user with no
knowledge of message realizations. Also note that the only randomness in Q
[θ]
DB is because of the θ
and the random permutation Γ.
4.3 The Two Examples Revisited
To illustrate the algorithmic formulation, let us revisit the two examples that were presented pre-
viously from an intuitive standpoint.
4.3.1 Example 1: N = 2,K = 2
Consider the simplest PIR setting, with N = 2 databases, and K = 2 messages with L = NK = 4
bits per message. Instead of our usual notation, i.e., U1 = [u1(1), u1(2), u1(3), u1(4)], for this
example it will be less cumbersome to use the notation U1 = [a1, a2, a3, a4]. Similarly, U2 =
[b1, b2, b3, b4]. The query structure and the outputs produced by the algorithm for θ = 1 as well as
for θ = 2 are shown below. The blocks are separated by horizontal lines. Within each block the I
terms are highlighted in red and the M terms are in black. Note that there are no terms in I for
the last block (Block K), because there are no K-sums that do not include the Uθ variables.
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Query Structure Ordered Output of Algorithm 1 for θ = 1 Ordered Output of Algorithm 1 for θ = 2
~Q(DB, θ)
Block 1 U1
U2
Block 2 U1 + U2
~Q(DB1, θ = 1) ~Q(DB2, θ = 1)
a1 a2
b1 b2
a3 + b2 a4 + b1
~Q(DB1, θ = 2) ~Q(DB2, θ = 2)
a1 a2
b1 b2
a2 + b3 a1 + b4
To verify that the scheme is correct, note that whether θ = 1 or θ = 2, every desired bit is either
downloaded directly (block 1) or appears with known side information that is available from the
other database. To see why privacy holds, recall that the queries are ultimately presented to the
database in terms of the message variables and the mapping from Uk to Wk is uniformly random
and independent of θ. So, consider an arbitrary realization of the query with (distinct) message
bits w1(i1), w2(i2) from W1 and w2(j1), w2(j2) from W2.
Γ( ~Q(DB, θ))
w1(i1)
w2(j1)
w1(i2) +w2(j2)
(15)
Given this query, the probability that it was generated for θ = 1 is ((14 )(
1
3 ))
2 = 1144 , which is the
same as the probability that it was generated for θ = 2. Thus, the query provides the database no
information about θ, and the scheme is private. This argument is presented in detail and generalized
to arbitrary K and N in Lemma 3. Finally, consider the rate of this scheme. The total number of
downloaded bits is 6, and the number of desired bits downloaded is 4, so the rate of this scheme is
4/6 = 2/3 which matches the capacity for this case.
4.3.2 Example 2: N = 3,K = 3
The second example is when K = 3, N = 3. In this case, both messages have L = NK = 27 bits.
U1 = [a1, a2, · · · , a27], U2 = [b1, b2, · · · , , b27], U3 = [c1, c2, · · · , c27]. The query structure and the
output of the algorithm for θ = 1 are shown below.
Query Strucure Ordered Output of Algorithm 1 for θ = 1
~Q(DB, θ)
Block 1 U1
U2
U3
Block 2 U1 + U2
U1 + U2
U1 + U3
U1 + U3
U2 + U3
U2 + U3
Block 3 U1 + U2 + U3
U1 + U2 + U3
U1 + U2 + U3
U1 + U2 + U3
~Q(DB1, θ = 1) ~Q(DB2, θ = 1) ~Q(DB3, θ = 1)
a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
c1 c2 c3
a4 + b2 a8 + b1 a12 + b1
a6 + b3 a10 + b3 a14 + b2
a5 + c2 a9 + c1 a13 + c1
a7 + c3 a11 + c3 a15 + c2
b4 + c4 b6 + c6 b8 + c8
b5 + c5 b7 + c7 b9 + c9
a16 + b6 + c6 a20 + b4 + c4 a24 + b4 + c4
a17 + b7 + c7 a21 + b5 + c5 a25 + b5 + c5
a18 + b8 + c8 a22 + b8 + c8 a26 + b6 + c6
a19 + b9 + c9 a23 + b9 + c9 a27 + b7 + c7
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The output of Algorithm 1, for θ = 2, is shown next.
~Q(DB1, θ = 2) ~Q(DB2, θ = 2) ~Q(DB3, θ = 2)
a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
c1 c2 c3
a2 + b4 a1 + b8 a1 + b12
a3 + b6 a3 + b10 a3 + b14
a4 + c4 a6 + c6 a8 + c8
a5 + c5 a7 + c7 a9 + c9
b5 + c2 b9 + c1 b13 + c1
b7 + c3 b11 + c3 b15 + c3
a6 + b16 + c6 a4 + b20 + c4 a4 + b24 + c4
a7 + b17 + c7 a5 + b21 + c5 a5 + b25 + c5
a8 + b18 + c8 a8 + b22 + c8 a6 + b26 + c6
a9 + b19 + c9 a9 + b23 + c9 a7 + b27 + c7
The output of Algorithm 1, for θ = 3, is shown next.
~Q(DB1, θ = 3) ~Q(DB2, θ = 3) ~Q(DB3, θ = 3)
a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
c1 c2 c3
a4 + b4 a6 + b6 a8 + b8
a5 + b5 a7 + b7 a9 + b9
a2 + c4 a1 + c8 a1 + c12
a3 + c6 a3 + c10 a2 + c14
b2 + c5 b1 + c9 b1 + c13
b3 + c7 b3 + c11 b2 + c15
a6 + b6 + c16 a4 + b4 + c20 a4 + b4 + c24
a7 + b7 + c17 a5 + b5 + c21 a5 + b5 + c25
a8 + b8 + c18 a8 + b8 + c22 a6 + b6 + c26
a9 + b9 + c19 a9 + b9 + c23 a7 + b7 + c27
Note that this construction retrieves 27 desired message bits out of a total of 39 downloaded bits,
so its rate is 27/39 = 9/13, which matches the capacity for this case.
4.4 Proof of Correctness, Privacy and Achieving Capacity
The following lemma confirms that the query set produced by the algorithm satisfies the required
structural properties.
Lemma 1 (Structure of Q(DB, θ)) For any θ ∈ [K] and for any DB ∈ [N ], the Q(DB, θ) produced
by Algorithm 1 satisfies the following properties.
1. For all k ∈ [K], block k contains exactly (N −1)k−1 instances of k-sums of each possible type.
2. No uk(i), i ∈ [N
K ] variable appears more than once within Q(DB, θ) for any given DB.
3. Exactly NK−1 variables for each Uk, k ∈ [K], appear in the query set Q(DB, θ).
4. The size of Q(DB, θ) is NK−1 + 1N−1(N
K−1 − 1).
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Proof:
1. Fix any arbitrary N . The proof is based on induction on the claim S(k), defined as follows.
S(k) : “Block k contains exactly (N − 1)k−1 instances of k-sums of all possible types.”
The basis step is when k = 1. This step is easily verified, because a 1-sum is simply one
variable, of which there are K possible types, and from (11), (12) in Algorithm 1, we note
that the first block always consists of one variable of each vector Uk, k ∈ [K].
We next proceed to the inductive step. Suppose S(k) is true. Then we wish to prove that
S(k+1) must be true as well. Here we have Block = k+1. First, consider (k+1)-sums of type
{i1, i2, · · · , ik+1} ⊂ [K]/{θ} where none of the indices is θ. These belong in Q(DB, θ, k+1,I),
and from line 11 of the algorithm it is verified that exactly (N−1)Block−1 = (N−1)k instances
are generated of this type. Next, consider the (k + 1)-sums of type {i1, i2, · · · , ik, θ} where
one of the indices is θ. These belong to Q(DB, θ, k + 1,M) and are obtained by adding
new(Uθ) to each of the k-sums of type {i1, i2, · · · , ik} that belong to Q(DB
′, θ, k,I) for all
DB′ 6= DB. Therefore, the number of instances of (k + 1)-sums of type {i1, i2, · · · , ik, θ} in
Q(DB, θ, k+1,M) must be equal to the product of the number of ‘other’ databases DB′, which
is equal to N − 1, and the number of instances of type {i1, i2, · · · , ik} in each database DB
′,
which is equal to (N − 1)k−1 because S(k) is assumed to be true as the induction hypothesis.
(N − 1)× (N − 1)k−1 = (N − 1)k, and thus, we have shown that S(k+1) is true, completing
the proof by induction.
2. From (11),(13), we see that for each block, the desired variables, i.e., the Uθ variables appear
only through the new(Uθ) function so that each of them only appears once. For the non-
desired variables Uk, k 6= θ, we see that the only time that they do not appear through the
new(Uk) function is when they enter through q in (13). However, from (13) we see that these
variables come from the I part of the previous block of other databases, where each of them
was only introduced once through a new(Uk) function. Moreover, each term from the I part
of the previous block of other databases is used exactly once. Therefore, these Uk variables
also appear no more than once in the query set of a given database.
3. Since we have shown that no variable appears more than once, we only need to count the
number of times each vector Uk, k ∈ [K] is invoked within Q(DB, θ). Consider any particular
vector, say Uj. The number of possible types of k-sums that include index j is
(
K−1
k−1
)
. As
we have also shown, the k-th block contains (N − 1)k−1 instances of k-sums of each type.
Therefore, the number of instances of vector Uj in block k is (N − 1)
k−1
(K−1
k−1
)
. Summing
over all K blocks within Q(DB, θ) we find
K∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K − 1
k − 1
)
= (N − 1 + 1)K−1 = NK−1 (Binomial Identity) (16)
4. The k-th block of Q(DB, θ) contains (N − 1)k−1 instances of k-sums of each possible type,
and there are
(K
k
)
possible types of k-sums. Therefore, the cardinality of Q(DB, θ) is
|Q(DB, θ)| =
K∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K
k
)
(17)
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=
K∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
[(
K − 1
k
)
+
(
K − 1
k − 1
)]
(18)
(16)
= NK−1 +
K−1∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K − 1
k
)
(19)
= NK−1 +
1
N − 1
K−1∑
k=1
(N − 1)k
(
K − 1
k
)
(20)
= NK−1 +
1
N − 1
[
K−1∑
k=0
(N − 1)k
(
K − 1
k
)
− 1
]
(21)
= NK−1 +
1
N − 1
(NK−1 − 1) (22)
We are now ready to prove that the achievable scheme is correct, private and achieves the
capacity, in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 The scheme described in Algorithm 1 is correct and the rate achieved is (1+1/N + · · ·+
1/NK−1)−1, which matches the capacity.
Proof: The scheme is correct, i.e., all desired variables, Uθ, are decodable (with zero error
probability), because either they appear with no interference (the first block) or they appear with
interference q that is also downloaded separately from another database DB′ so it can be subtracted.
From Lemma 1 we know that there are NK−1 desired bit-variables in each Q(DB, θ). Note that
desired variables always appear through new(Uθ), so they do not repeat across databases. Thus,
the total number of desired bits that are retrieved is N ×NK−1 = NK .
We next compute the rate. The total number of desired bits retrieved is NK , and the total
number of downloaded bits from all databases is N × |Q(DB, θ)| in every case. Therefore, the rate,
R =
NK
N × |Q(DB, θ)|
(23)
=
NK
N [NK−1 + 1N−1(N
K−1 − 1)]
(24)
=
(
NK−1 + 1N−1(N
K−1 − 1)
NK−1
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
N−1(N
K−1 − 1)
NK−1
)−1
(25)
=
(
1 +
1
N (1−
1
NK−1
)
1− 1N
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)−1
(26)
Lemma 3 The scheme described in Algorithm 1 is private.
Proof: The intuition is quite straightforward. Regardless of θ, every realization of the query
vector that fits the query structure is equally likely because of the uniformly random permutation
Γ. To formalize this intuition, let us calculate the probability of an arbitrary query realization.
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For any DB ∈ [N ], θ ∈ [K], consider the ordered query vector representation ~Q(DB, θ). For
each Uk, k ∈ [K], denote the order in which these symbols appear in ~Q(DB, θ), as ~uk(DB, θ) =
[uk(ik,DB,θ,1), uk(ik,DB,θ,2), · · · , uk(ik,DB,θ,NK−1)]. Since the ordered query structure is already fixed
regardless of θ and DB, and no variable occurs more than once, ~Q(DB, θ) is completely determined by
(~u1(DB, θ), ~u2(DB, θ), · · · , ~uK(DB, θ)). Similarly, for each k ∈ [K], denote an arbitrary N
K−1-tuple
of bits from message Wk by ~wk = [wk(i
′
k1
), wk(i
′
k2
), · · · , wk(i
′
k
NK−1
)]. Recall that uk(i) = wk(γk(i)),
∀k ∈ [K], i ∈ [NK ], and γ1, γ2, · · · , γK are uniform permutations chosen independently of each
other and also independently of θ. Therefore, for all (~w1, ~w2, · · · , ~wK), we have
Prob
(
Γ (~u1(DB, θ), ~u2(DB, θ), · · · , ~uK(DB, θ)) = (~w1, ~w2, · · · , ~wK)
)
=
K∏
k=1
Prob
(
Γ(~uk(DB, θ)) = ~wk
)
(27)
=
((
1
NK
)(
1
NK − 1
)
· · ·
(
1
NK −NK−1 + 1
))K
(28)
which does not depend on θ. Thus, the distribution of ~Q(DB, θ) does not depend on θ. Since
Q
[θ]
DB is a function of ~Q(DB, θ), Q
[θ]
DB must be independent of θ as well. Next, we show that privacy
requirement (8) must be satisfied.
I(θ;Q
[θ]
DB, A
[θ]
DB,W1:K) = I(θ;Q
[θ]
DB) + I(θ;W1:K |Q
[θ]
DB) + I(θ;A
[θ]
DB|W1:K , Q
[θ]
DB) (29)
= 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 (30)
where I(θ;Q
[θ]
DB) = 0 because we have already proved thatQ
[θ]
DB is independent of θ, I(θ;W1:K |Q
[θ]
DB) =
0 because the desired message index and the query are generated privately by the user with
no knowledge of the messages, and I(θ;A
[θ]
DB|W1:K , Q
[θ]
DB) = 0 because the answer is determin-
istic function of the query and messages. Therefore, all information available to database DB
(Q
[θ]
DB, A
[θ]
DB,W1, · · · ,WK) is independent of θ and the scheme is private.
Remark: From the proofs of privacy and correctness, note that the key is the query structure
and the random mapping, Γ, of message bits to the query structure. In particular, no assumption
is required on the statistics of the messages themselves. So the scheme works and a rate equal to
Co remains achievable even if the messages are not independent, although it may no longer be the
capacity for this setting. For example, if N = K = 2 and the two messages are identical, W1 =W2,
then clearly the capacity is 1, which is higher than Co = 2/3. The independence of the messages is,
however, needed for the converse.
We end this section with a lemma that highlights a curious property of our capacity achieving
PIR scheme – that if the scheme is projected onto any subset of messages by eliminating the
remaining messages, it also achieves the PIR capacity for that subset of messages.
Lemma 4 Given a capacity achieving scheme generated by Algorithm 1 for K messages, if we set
∆, 1 ≤ ∆ ≤ K − 1 messages to be null, then the scheme achieves the capacity for the remaining
K −∆ messages.
Proof: We first prove that the scheme is correct after eliminating messages. This is easy to see
as eliminating messages does not hurt (influence) the decoding procedure. Note that the eliminated
messages can not include the desired one. We next prove that the scheme is also private. This
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is also easy to see as the permutations of the messages are independent, so that after eliminating
messages, the bits of the remaining messages still distribute identically, no matter which message
is desired. We finally compute the rate and show that the scheme achieves the capacity for the
remaining messages. Note that the total number of desired bits does not change, i.e., it is still NK .
The total number of downloaded equations decreases, as ∆ messages are set to 0. In particular,
the following number of equations becomes 0.
N
∆∑
k=1
(
∆
k
)
(N − 1)k−1 (31)
= N
1
N − 1
[
∆∑
k=0
(
∆
k
)
(N − 1)k − 1
]
(32)
= N
1
N − 1
(N∆ − 1) (33)
Subtracting above fromN |Q(DB, θ)|, we have the total number of downloaded equations. Therefore,
the rate achieved is
R =
NK
N |Q(DB, θ)| −N 1N−1(N
∆ − 1)
(34)
=
NK
N [NK−1 + 1N−1(N
K−1 − 1)− 1N−1(N
∆ − 1)]
(35)
=
(
NK−1 + 1N−1 (N
K−1 −N∆)
NK−1
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
N−1(N
K−1 −N∆)
NK−1
)−1
(36)
=
(
1 +
1
N (1−
1
NK−∆−1
)
1− 1N
)−1
=
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−∆−1
)−1
(37)
which matches the capacity.
5 Theorem 1: Converse
Note that the converse is proved for arbitrary L, i.e., we no longer assume that L = NK . Let us
start with two useful lemmas. Note that in the proofs, the relevant equations needed to justify each
step are specified by the equation numbers set on top of the (in)equality symbols.
Lemma 5 I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |W1) ≤ L(1/R − 1 + o(L))
Proof:
I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |W1)
(3)
= I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N ,W1) (38)
= I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N ) + I(W2:K ;W1|Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N ) (39)
(7)
= I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N ) + o(L)L (40)
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(5)
= I(W2:K ;A
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N ) + o(L)L (41)
= H(A
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N )−H(A
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:K) + o(L)L (42)
≤ D −H(W1, A
[1]
1:N |Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:K) +H(W1|A
[1]
1:N , Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:K) + o(L)L (43)
(9)(6)(7)
= L/R −H(W1|Q
[1]
1:N ,W2:K) + o(L)L (44)
(5)(3)(4)
= L/R − L+ o(L)L = L(1/R − 1 + o(L)) (45)
Lemma 6 For all k ∈ {2, · · · ,K},
I(Wk:K ;Q
[k−1]
1:N , A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1) ≥
1
N
I(Wk+1:K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |W1:k) +
L(1− o(L))
N
. (46)
Proof:
NI(Wk:K ;Q
[k−1]
1:N , A
[k−1]
1:N |W1:k−1)
≥
N∑
n=1
I(Wk:K ;Q
[k−1]
n , A
[k−1]
n |W1:k−1) (47)
(8)
=
N∑
n=1
I(Wk:K ;Q
[k]
n , A
[k]
n |W1:k−1) (48)
≥
N∑
n=1
I(Wk:K ;A
[k]
n |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
n ) (49)
(6)
=
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
n ) (50)
≥
N∑
n=1
H(A[k]n |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:n−1) (51)
(6)
=
N∑
n=1
I(Wk:K ;A
[k]
n |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:n−1) (52)
= I(Wk:K ;A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1, Q
[k]
1:N ) (53)
(5)(3)
= I(Wk:K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1) (54)
(7)
= I(Wk:K ;Wk, Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |W1:k−1)− o(L)L (55)
= I(Wk:K ;Wk|W1:k−1) + I(Wk:K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |W1:k)− o(L)L (56)
(3)(4)
= L+ I(Wk:K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |W1:k)− o(L)L (57)
= I(Wk+1:K ;Q
[k]
1:N , A
[k]
1:N |W1:k) + L(1− o(L) (58)
With these lemmas we are ready to prove the converse.
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Proof of Converse of Theorem 1
Starting from k = 2 and applying Lemma 6 repeatedly for k = 3 to K,
I(W2:K ;Q
[1]
1:N , A
[1]
1:N |W1)
≥
L
N
(1− o(L)) +
1
N
I(W3:K ;Q
[2]
1:N , A
[2]
1:N |W1,W2) (59)
≥
L
N
(1− o(L)) +
1
N
[
L
N
(1− o(L)) +
1
N
I(W4:K ;Q
[3]
1:N , A
[3]
1:N |W1:3)
]
(60)
= L(1− o(L))(
1
N
+
1
N2
) +
1
N2
I(W4:K ;Q
[3]
1:N , A
[3]
1:N |W1:3) (61)
≥ · · · (62)
≥ L(1− o(L))(
1
N
+ · · · +
1
NK−2
) +
1
NK−2
I(WK ;Q
[K−1]
1:N , A
[K−1]
1:N |W1:K−1) (63)
≥ L(1− o(L))(
1
N
+ · · · +
1
NK−1
) (64)
Combining Lemma 5 and (64), we have
L(
1
R
− 1 + o(L)) ≥ L(1− o(L))(
1
N
+ · · · +
1
NK−1
) (65)
Dividing both sides by L and letting L go to infinity gives us
1
R
− 1 ≥
(
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
(66)
⇒ R ≤
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · · +
1
NK−1
)−1
(67)
thus, completing the proof.
6 Discussion
In this section we share some interesting insights beyond the capacity characterization.
Upload Cost
To ensure privacy, we appealed to randomization arguments. To specify the randomly chosen query
to the databases incurs an upload cost. For large messages the upload cost is negligible relative to
the download cost, so it was ignored in this work. However, if the upload cost is a concern then
it could be optimized as well. Random permutations of message bits are sufficient for privacy, but
it is easy to see that the upload cost can be reduced by reducing the number of possibilities to be
considered. For example, consider the K = 2 messages, N = 2 databases setting. We can group
the bits, i.e., we can divide the 4 bits of each message into 2 groups, so that when we choose 2
bits, we only choose 2 bits from the same group. This reduces the choice to 1 out of 2 groups
(rather than 2 out of 4 bits). Further, it may be possible to avoid random permutations among
the chosen bits (group). For the same K = 2 messages and N = 2 databases example, we can fix
the order within each group and the scheme becomes the following. We denote the messages bits
as W1 = {u1, u2, u3, u4},W2 = {v1, v2, v3, v4}.
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Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2
Want W1 Want W2 Want W1 Want W2
Database 1 u1, v1, u2 + v2 u1, v1, u2 + v2 u3, v3, u4 + v4 u3, v3, u4 + v4
Database 2 u4, v2, u3 + v1 u2, v4, u1 + v3 u2, v4, u1 + v3 u4, v2, u3 + v1
Note that regardless of which message is desired, the user is equally likely to request either
u1, v1, u2 + v2 or u3, v3, u4 + v4 from DB1, and either u2, v4, u1 + v3 or u4, v2, u3 + v1 from DB2, so
the scheme is private. However, each query is now limited to only 2 possibilities, thereby signifi-
cantly reducing the upload cost. Also note that instead of storing all 8 bits that constitute the two
messages, each database only needs to store 6 bits in this case, corresponding to the two possible
queries that it may face. Reducing the storage overhead is an interesting question that has been
explored by Fazeli, Vardy and Yaakobi in [32].
Another interesting question in this context is to determine the upload constrained capacity.
An information theoretic perspective is still useful. For example, since we are able to reduce the
upload cost for K = 2, N = 2 to two possibilities, one might wonder if it is possible to reduce the
upload cost of the K = 3, N = 2 setting to 3 possibilities without loss of capacity. Let us label
the three possible downloads from DB1 as f1, f2, f3 and the three possible downloads from DB2
as g1, g2, g3. We wish to find out if the original PIR capacity of 4/7 is still achievable under these
upload constraints. As we show next, the capacity is strictly reduced. With uploads limited to
choosing one out of only 3 possibilities, the upload constrained capacity of the K = 3, N = 2 setting
is 1/2 instead of 4/7. Eliminating trivial degenerate cases, in this case there is no loss of generality in
assuming that we can recover W1 from any one of these three possibilities: (f1, g1), (f2, g2), (f3, g3);
we can recover W2 from any one of these three possibilities: (f1, g2), (f2, g3), (f3, g1); and we can
recover W3 from any one of these three possibilities: (f1, g3), (f2, g1), (f3, g2). Then, for the optimal
scheme we have
H(W1) = I(W1; f1, g1) (68)
≤ 2H(A) −H(f1, g1|W1) (69)
Similarly, H(W1) ≤ 2H(A) −H(f2, g2|W1) (70)
Adding the two, 2H(W1) ≤ 4H(A) −H(f1, g1, f2, g2|W1) (71)
≤ 4H(A) −H(W1,W2,W3|W1) (72)
≤ 4H(A) −H(W2,W3) (73)
⇒ C = H(W1)/2H(A) ≤ 1/2 (74)
Here, 2H(A) is the total download. (72) follows because from f1, g1, f2, g2 we can recover all three
messages. Thus, if the upload can only resolve one out of three possibilities for the query to each
database, then the capacity of such a PIR scheme cannot be more than 1/2, which is strictly smaller
than the PIR capacity without upload constraints, 4/7. In fact, the upload constrained capacity
in this case is exactly 1/2, as shown by the following achievable scheme which is interesting in its
own right for how it fully exploits interference alignment. Suppose W1,W2,W3 are symbols from a
sufficiently large finite field (e.g., F5). Then the following construction works.
f1 = W1 + 2W2 +W3 (75)
f2 = W1 + 4W2 + 3W3 (76)
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f3 = 3W1 + 4W2 + 6W3 (77)
g1 = W1 + 4W2 + 2W3 (78)
g2 = 3W1 + 4W2 + 3W3 (79)
g3 = 2W1 + 4W2 + 6W3 (80)
It is easy to verify that W1 can be recovered from any one of (f1, g1), (f2, g2), (f3, g3); W2 can
be recovered from any one of (f1, g2), (f2, g3), (f3, g1); and W3 can be recovered from any one of
(f1, g3), (f2, g1), (f3, g2). The reason we can recover the desired message symbol from two equations,
even though all three message symbols are involved in those two equations, is because of this special
construction, which forces the undesired symbols to align into one dimension in every case. Thus,
the upload constrained capacity for K = 3, N = 2 when the randomness is limited to choosing
one out of 3 possibilities, is 1/2. Answering this question for arbitrary K,N and arbitrary upload
constraints is an interesting direction for future work.
Message Size
The information theoretic formulation of the PIR problem allows the sizes of messages to grow
arbitrarily large. A natural question is this – how large do we need each message to be for the
optimal scheme. In our scheme, each message consists of NK bits. However, even for our capacity
achieving PIR scheme, the size of a message may be reduced. As an example, for the same K = 2
messages and N = 2 databases setting, the following PIR scheme works just as well (still achieves
the same capacity) when each message is only made up of 2 bits: W1 = (u1, u2), W2 = (v1, v2).
Prob. 1/2 Prob. 1/2
Want W1 Want W2 Want W1 Want W2
Database 1 u1, v2 u1, v2 u2, v1 u2, v1
Database 2 u2 + v2 u1 + v1 u1 + v1 u2 + v2
Determining the smallest message size needed to achieve the PIR capacity, or the message size
constrained PIR capacity, is another interesting direction for future work.
Similarities between PIR and Blind Interference Alignment
The idea of blind interference alignment was introduced in [13] to take advantage of the diversity of
coherence intervals that may arise in a wireless network. For instance, different channels may expe-
rience different coherence times and coherence bandwidths. A diversity of coherence patterns can
also be artificially induced by the switching of reconfigurable antennas in pre-determined patterns.
As one of the simplest examples of BIA, consider a K user interference channel, where the desired
channels have coherence time 1, i.e., they change after every channel use, while the cross channels
(which carry interference) have coherence time 2, i.e., they remain unchanged over two channel
uses. The transmitters are aware of the coherence times but otherwise have no knowledge of the
channel coefficients. The BIA scheme operates over two consecutive channel uses. Over these two
channel uses, each transmitter repeats its information symbol, and each receiver simply calculates
the difference of its received signals. Since the transmitted symbols remain the same and the cross
channels do not change, the difference of received signals from the two channel uses eliminates all
interference terms. However, because the desired channels change, the desired information symbols
survive the difference at each receiver. Thus, one desired information symbol is successfully sent
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for each message over 2 channel uses, free from interference, achieving 12 DoF per message. Re-
markably, this is essentially identical to the example of PIR included in the introduction, i.e., (1),
(2). Applications of BIA extend well beyond this simple example [33, 34, 35, 36]. For instance, in
the X channel comprised of M transmitters and K receivers, using only the knowledge of suitable
channel coherence patterns, BIA schemes achieve MKM+K−1 DoF, which cannot be improved upon
even with perfect channel knowledge [13, 33]. The connection to PIR also extends naturally as
follows.
The number of users in the BIA problem translates into the number of messages in the PIR
problem. The received signals for user θ in BIA, translate into the answering strings when message
Wθ is the desired message in the PIR problem. The channel vectors associated with user θ in the
BIA problem translate into the query vectors for desired message Wθ in the PIR problem. The
privacy requirement of the PIR scheme takes advantage of the observation that in BIA, over each
channel use, the received signal at each receiver is statistically equivalent, because the transmitter
does not know the channel values and the channel to each receiver has the same distribution. The
most involved aspect of translating from BIA to PIR is that in BIA, the knowledge of the channel
realizations across channel uses reveals the switching pattern, which in turn reveals the identity of
the receiver. To remove this identifying feature of the BIA scheme, the channel uses are divided
into subgroups such that the knowledge of the switching pattern within each group reveals nothing
about the identity of the receiver. Each sub-group of channel uses is then associated with a different
database. Since the databases are not allowed to communicate with each other, and each sub-group
of queries (channel uses) reveals nothing about the message (user), the resulting scheme guarantees
privacy. Finally, the symmetric degrees of freedom (DoF) value per user in BIA is the ratio between
the number of desired message symbols and the number of channel uses (received signal equations),
and the rate R in PIR is the ratio between the number of symbols of the desired message and the
total number of equations in all answering strings. In this way, the DoF value achieved with BIA
translates into the rate of the corresponding PIR protocol, i.e., R = DoF. We summarize these
connections in the following table.
PIR BIA
Message Receiver
Queries Channel Coefficients
Answers Received Signals
Rate DoF
Recognizing this connection between PIR and BIA directly leads to capacity achieving PIR
schemes for K = 2 messages, and arbitrary number of databases N , as in [10], by translating
from known optimal BIA schemes. However, for K > 2, the PIR framework generalizes the BIA
framework. This is because the coherence patterns that are assumed to exist in BIA are typically
motivated by the distinct coherence times, coherence bandwidths, or antenna switching patterns
that are feasible in wireless settings. However, since PIR is not bound by wireless phenomena,
it allows for arbitrary coherence patterns, including many possibilities that would be considered
infeasible in wireless settings. Even the simple scheme of BIA for the K user interference channel
presented earlier, was originally noted in BIA [13] merely as a matter of curiosity rather than
having any physical significance. As such, while our initial insights into PIR came by viewing it as
a special case of existing BIA schemes, the new capacity achieving PIR schemes introduced in this
work go well beyond existing results in BIA, by allowing arbitrary coherence patterns.
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7 Conclusion
Information theorists commonly study the optimal coding rates of communication problems deal-
ing with a few messages, each carrying an asymptotically large number of bits, while computer
scientists often study the computational complexity of problems dealing with an asymptotically
large number of messages, each carrying only a few bits (e.g., 1 bit per message). The occasional
crossover of problems between the two fields opens up exciting opportunities for new insights. A
prominent example is the index coding problem [1, 2], originally posed by computer scientists and
recently studied from an information theoretic perspective. The information theoretic capacity
characterization for the index coding problem is now recognized as perhaps one of the most im-
portant open problems in network information theory, because of its fundamental connections to a
broad range of questions that includes topological interference management, network coding, dis-
tributed storage, hat guessing, and non-Shannon information inequalities. Like index coding, the
PIR problem also involves non-trivial interference alignment principles and is related to problems
like blind interference alignment [13] that have previously been studied in the context of wireless
networks. In fact, it was the pursuit of these connections that brought us to the PIR problem [10].
Further, PIR belongs to another rich class of problems studied in computer science, with deep con-
nections to oblivious transfer [14], instance hiding [15, 16, 17], and distributed computation with
untrusted servers [18]. Bringing this class of problems into the domain of information theoretic
studies holds much promise for new insights and fundamental progress. The characterization of the
information theoretic capacity of Private Information Retrieval is a step in this direction.
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